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Abstract 
Thomas (1999) documents that investors discount the value of foreign earnings for U.S. 
multinationals. He conjectures but does not test the possibility that this finding is due to poor 
disclosure related to foreign operations. In this paper, we investigate whether the market’s valuation 
of foreign earnings is a function of the firm’s geographic segment disclosures. Specifically, we 
examine the effects of (1) the introduction of SFAS 131, (2) the change in the number of geographic 
segments disclosed, and (3) the inclusion of performance measures in geographic segment 
disclosures. We find strong evidence that our proxies for increased disclosure are positively 
associated with the foreign earnings response coefficient (FERC). In addition, we use the Mishkin 
(1983) test and find that investors’ mispricing of the foreign component of earnings lessens (and in 
fact disappears) with greater disclosure related to foreign operations. Taken together, our results 
suggest that the pricing of foreign earnings is associated with important aspects of the firm’s 
information environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates investors’ pricing of foreign earnings of U.S. multinational firms.  
We relate the pricing of foreign earnings to certain aspects of Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), which changes the way in which many multinational firms 
report their geographic segment information. Specifically, we first examine whether the overall 
adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) affects the pricing 
of foreign earnings. We then test whether cross-sectional differences in geographic segment 
disclosures post SFAS 131 relate to the pricing of foreign earnings. Examining the pricing of 
earnings components is of interest to both practitioners and academics because of the potential 
for investors to more precisely forecast earnings and estimate firm value (Khurana, Pereira, and 
Raman 2003; Lipe 1986; and others). Foreign operations can experience profitability, growth, 
and risk patterns that differ significantly from those of domestic operations (Bodnar, Hwang, and 
Weintrop 2003). Consequently, both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandate the disclosure of information relevant for 
assessing firms’ foreign operations.  
Research has examined how investors value the foreign versus domestic components of 
earnings and whether geographic segment disclosures are useful to investors.  Boatsman, Behn, 
and Patz (1993) examine whether equity valuations of U.S. multinationals are affected by SFAS 
14 mandated geographic segment income disclosures. For the most part, the authors conclude 
that there is little evidence that SFAS 14 geographic segment income disclosures are used by 
investors. Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) split earnings into their domestic and foreign components 
using SEC mandated disclosures (SEC Regulation §210.4-08(h)). They document that both 
foreign and domestic earnings changes are significantly positively associated with annual excess 
 2 
stock returns and that the coefficient on foreign earnings is significantly larger than the 
coefficient on domestic earnings. They attribute their finding to greater growth opportunities in 
foreign markets. Consistent with these findings, Thomas (1999) documents that foreign earnings 
are more persistent than are domestic earnings. He also shows, however, that stocks are 
(temporarily) mispriced relative to the firm’s current change in foreign earnings. He conjectures, 
but does not test, the possibility that this finding may be explained by poor disclosure of foreign 
operations. In other words, investors cautiously discount the value of the foreign earnings 
streams, which seems plausible given the relatively poor disclosure of foreign operations 
provided by many firms (e.g., White, Sondhi, and Fried 2003, 577).  
Prior theoretical research provides several reasons why low-quality disclosures can have 
an adverse effect on the valuation of a firm’s earnings. First, low-quality disclosures increase the 
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital because investors tend to discount the 
value of stocks for which limited information is available (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The 
information asymmetry could arise either between the firm and investors or among investors 
(e.g., Francis et al. 2004). Regarding information asymmetry between the firm and investors, 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) show how poor quality disclosure creates information risk. Investors 
anticipate this and demand a higher risk premium (i.e., they charge a higher cost of capital). 
Regarding information asymmetry among investors, Easley and O’Hara (2004) show that, in a 
model with informed and uninformed investors, the information risk faced by the uninformed 
investors is not diversifiable and will therefore be priced. The information risk is reduced with 
the precision of firm disclosure. Regardless of its source, if information asymmetry is especially 
severe for foreign operations (as the extant literature suggests), then the risk-adjusted discount 
rate for foreign earnings should decrease when the information environment improves. 
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Second, when the amount or quality of publicly available information about a firm is low, 
investors must undergo the cost of gathering and processing private information. This additional 
cost will increase investors’ required return. As the firm’s information environment improves, 
investors’ information acquisition cost is reduced because they can now free-ride on the 
information that the firm produces (e.g., Diamond 1985). The more the firm discloses the more 
investors free-ride. Thus, an improvement in geographic segment disclosures should reduce 
investors’ private information search costs related to foreign earnings, reducing the expected 
return. 
Third, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) suggest that the price reaction to the release of 
information is negatively related to the noisiness of the information signal. If geographic 
disclosures provide a noisy set of information about valuation-relevant future cash flows, then 
price changes associated with a given amount of unexpected foreign earnings will be smaller. To 
the extent that improved geographic disclosures can reduce the noise in foreign earnings, the 
price response to unexpected foreign earnings should increase.1  
Consistent with Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), we find that both domestic and foreign 
earnings are value relevant. More importantly, we find strong evidence that our proxies for 
increased disclosure are positively associated with the foreign earnings response coefficient 
(FERC hereafter). That is, (1) time-series tests show that FERC increases with the introduction 
of SFAS 131, (2) cross-sectional tests show that FERC increases with increased geographic 
segment disaggregation post SFAS 131, and (3) cross-sectional tests show that FERC increases 
                                                 
1
 Collins and Salatka (1993) test the model of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) following the adoption of SFAS 52 
by multinational firms. SFAS 52 was meant to improve foreign currency accounting compared to that under SFAS 
8. They find that the response to unexpected earnings increases after implementation of SFAS 52, suggesting that 
investors perceive earnings under the new standard to be a less noisy measure of future cash flows. 
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with the inclusion of earnings in geographic segment disclosures post SFAS 131.2 Our findings 
are robust to alternative sample designs and to a number of sensitivity tests, including controls 
for extent of foreign operations, differential growth rates between domestic and foreign 
operations, firm size, profitability, structural changes related to mergers and acquisitions, internal 
growth or divestitures, and self-selection biases. In addition, we conduct Mishkin (1983) tests to 
examine whether the investor mispricing documented by Thomas (1999) is mitigated with 
greater geographic disclosure. Results of these tests indicate that investors’ mispricing lessens 
(and in fact disappears) with the introduction of SFAS 131. Taken together, our results suggest 
that the pricing of foreign earnings is associated with important aspects of the firm’s information 
environment.  
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we provide further 
empirical support for the usefulness of SFAS 131 disclosures. In particular, we interpret our 
results as evidence that such disclosures enhance the relevance of foreign earnings numbers. As 
U.S. companies are becoming increasingly multinational, an understanding of their foreign 
operations is essential to investors, and useful disclosure of this information is of interest to 
standard setters. Second, by providing evidence of a positive relation between the voluntary 
inclusion of earnings in geographic segment disclosures and the pricing of foreign earnings, we 
help inform the ongoing debate on whether such disclosures should be mandated.3  As discussed 
in more detail below, geographic earnings disclosures mandated by SFAS 14 are no longer 
required under SFAS 131 for many firms. In addition, our Mishkin test provides support for the 
claim that additional disclosures can reduce market mispricing.  This study is one of the first 
                                                 
2
 In this paper, we use the terms “earnings” and “performance measures” interchangeably. 
3
 Since we do not consider costs that would be imposed on the firm if such disclosures were mandated, we are not 
able to conclude that mandating these disclosures would increase social welfare. Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) 
discuss conditions under which requiring firms to disclose information improves social welfare. 
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attempts to show that improved disclosure reduces mispricing. Such retesting of market 
mispricing based on changes in disclosure has a wide variety of applications in the accounting 
literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide 
background on segment disclosures and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 defines the earnings 
and abnormal stock return variables we use, describes the sample selection, and provides 
descriptive statistics. The empirical results are provided in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we first discuss the changes in the firm’s disclosure brought about by 
SFAS 131. We then present our hypotheses related to how both mandatory changes in 
geographic segment disclosure following SFAS 131 and firms’ voluntary segment disclosure 
choices are associated with the pricing of foreign earnings. 
 
2.1 Background on SFAS 131  
SFAS No. 131 (Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information) 
became effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997 (FASB 1997). It superseded 
SFAS 14 (Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise) which had come under 
severe criticism from various user groups. Perhaps most importantly, the CFA Institute (formerly 
the Association for Investment Management and Research or AIMR) issued a position paper in 
1993 requesting that financial statement information be disaggregated to a much greater degree 
and more information be provided for segments (AIMR 1993).4 Similarly, the AICPA Special 
                                                 
4
 Paragraph 45 of SFAS 131 includes the following statement: “There is no disagreement among AIMR members 
that segment information is totally vital to their work. There also is general agreement among them that the current 
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Committee on Financial Reporting (1994) listed improved segment information as its number 
one recommendation.  
Firms were required to disclose segment information under SFAS 14 by both line-of-
business and geographic area with no specific link to the internal organization of the company. 
SFAS 131 fundamentally changes the manner in which firms provide segment information 
(Herrmann and Thomas 2000). The standard requires companies to report disaggregated 
information about reportable operating segments based on management’s organization of the 
enterprise (the “management approach”). An operating segment is defined as a component of an 
enterprise (1) that engages in business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur 
expenses, (2) whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the enterprise’s chief operating 
decision maker, and (3) for which discrete financial information is available (SFAS 131, 
paragraph 10). Under SFAS 131, operating segments may be based on products and services, 
geographic location, legal entity, customer type, or another basis. For each operating segment, 
firms must provide information about segment profit or loss, certain revenue and expense items, 
and assets. In addition, SFAS 131 requires supplemental “enterprise-wide disclosures” about 
products and services, geographic areas, and major customers if they are not already included as 
part of the operating segment disclosures. For companies that do not define operating segments 
on the basis of geographic location, SFAS 131 requires the disclosure of revenues from external 
customers and long-lived assets for each material country.5 This represents a major difference 
                                                                                                                                                             
segment reporting standard, Financial Accounting Standard No. 14, is inadequate.” Likewise, Epstein and Palepu 
(1999) report that many sell-side analysts consider segment disclosures as the most useful data for their investment 
recommendations. 
5
 Materiality is not specifically defined for enterprise-wide disclosures. According to Herrmann and Thomas (2000), 
many companies use 10% as a threshold. Doupnik and Seese (2001), however, find that many firms use quantitative 
thresholds less than 10%. In addition to providing information by individual material country, SFAS 131 indicates 
that “an enterprise may want to provide subtotals of geographic information about groupings of countries” 
(paragraph 38). 
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from SFAS 14, under which firms were allowed to disclose geographic information by 
geographic region. Many users complained that the regional disclosures were of limited use. 
Street, Nichols, and Gray (2000) report that the consistency of segment information and 
the number of total segments reported increased significantly with the introduction of SFAS 
131.6 Based on these findings, the authors conclude that business reporting improved with SFAS 
131. Berger and Hann (2003a) and Herrmann and Thomas (2000) report similar findings. 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) also document that for enterprise-wide disclosures, the proportion 
of country-level geographic segments has increased, while the proportion of broader geographic 
area segment disclosures has decreased. However, unlike SFAS 14 which required disclosure of 
geographic earnings, SFAS 131 does not mandate the disclosure of earnings by geographic area 
when the firm defines operating segments along industry lines. As a result, Herrmann and 
Thomas (2000) and Street et al. (2000) find that relatively few companies voluntarily disclose 
profit by geographic area under SFAS 131. In addition, for those firms that choose to include 
earnings in their geographic segment disclosures, SFAS 131 does not define which measure of 
segment profit or loss should be used. Rather, it allows any measure to be reported as long as that 
measure is used internally for decision making. Hence, there is some mixed evidence regarding 
the potential usefulness of geographic segment disclosures following SFAS 131. In the next 
section, we introduce hypotheses related to whether SFAS 131 disclosures relate to the pricing of 
foreign earnings. 
 
                                                 
6
 Similarly, a 1998 report by Bear Stearns emphasizes the improvement in the consistency of descriptions of the 
business throughout the president’s letter, management discussion and analysis, and notes. 
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2.2 Hypotheses development 
Investors and analysts often assert that segment disclosures are among the most important 
information provided by firms. For example, in a recent CFA Institute survey (“Global Corporate 
Financial Reporting Quality,” October 27, 2003), 71% of investment professionals rated segment 
disclosures as either “very” or “extremely” important. Prior research finds that, under certain 
conditions, geographic segment disclosures potentially enhance predictability of consolidated 
amounts (e.g., Balakrishnan, Harris, and Sen 1990; Nichols, Tunnell, and Seipel 1995; Herrmann 
1996). However, user groups complained that firms’ disclosure practices under SFAS 14 were 
inadequate and research has shown that investors did not use SFAS 14 geographic segment 
earnings disclosure in valuing securities (Boatsman et al. 1993). 
Given firms’ low-quality disclosures under SFAS 14, investors may have cautiously 
discounted the value of foreign earnings (Thomas 1999; Khurana et al. 2003; Callen, Hope, and 
Segal 2005). If geographic segment disclosures under SFAS 131 represent an improvement to 
investors in forecasting future earnings and hence valuing the firm more accurately, then the 
valuation discount applied to foreign earnings should decrease in the level of such disclosure.7,8 
We present several related hypotheses (all stated in the alternative form). Our hypotheses 
examine whether the valuation of foreign earnings relates to geographic segment disclosures. 
Specifically, we consider whether the valuation of foreign earnings varies with the introduction 
of SFAS 131, with the change in the number of geographic segments following SFAS 131, and 
                                                 
7
 Prior research has examined the role of enhanced disclosure in reducing estimation risk (where estimation risk is 
triggered by information asymmetry) and concludes that greater disclosure may reduce estimation risk and that this 
risk is non-diversifiable (e.g., Barry and Brown 1985; Handa and Linn 1993; Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay 1995; 
Easley and O’Hara 2004). Improved disclosure may also reduce the noise related to forecasting future earnings, 
thereby increasing the response to unexpected earnings (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988). 
8
 Ettredge et al. (2005) find that firms’ adoption of the segment disclosure requirements contained in SFAS 131 is 
associated with an increase in the stock market’s ability to predict the firm’s future earnings. 
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with the inclusion or exclusion of performance measures in geographic segment disclosures 
following SFAS 131. 
Consistent with prior literature which suggests that SFAS 131 potentially improves 
geographic segment reporting (e.g., Street et al. 2000; Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Behn, 
Nichols, and Street 2002), investors may now assess the company “through the eyes of 
management.” Related to this, our first hypothesis investigates whether the overall impact of 
adopting SFAS 131 affects the valuation of foreign earnings: 
 
H1: FERC is higher after adoption of SFAS 131.    
 
Not all firms increased their number of reported geographic segments following SFAS 
131, and some even reduced the number of geographic segments (e.g., Herrmann and Thomas 
2000). Segment information provided at a less aggregated level should be at least as useful as 
that provided at a more aggregated level.9 Therefore, an increase in the number of segments 
should result in higher-quality disclosures. The second hypothesis examines in the post-SFAS 
131 period whether firms that increased their reported number of geographic segments after 
adoption of SFAS 131 have a higher FERC compared to firms that had no increase:10 
                                                 
9
 This is an application of the fineness (or Blackwell) theorem from information economics. Briefly, the theorem 
states that the information in X is preferred to the information in Y as long as every signal from X is fully contained 
in a signal from Y (e.g., Demski 1977). For example, Piotroski (2003a) finds that segment reporting fineness is 
negatively associated with information asymmetry about future earnings realizations.  There are conditions under 
which the fineness theorem, however, may not hold. For example, if segment data are measured or reported with 
error, decisions using the finer data need not be as accurate as decisions using consolidated data alone (e.g., Givoly, 
Hayn, and D’Souza 1999).  
10
 Given that SFAS 131 changed not only the number of reported segments but also the definition of segments, it is 
conceivable that for some firms (and under certain circumstances), a decrease in reported segments could in fact 
yield a more informative system. However, we would consider this to be the exception rather than the rule. The 
prime intent of SFAS 131 was for firms to disaggregate their segment information (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2005; FASB 
1997). In addition, as described above, both the AICPA Special Committee (AICPA 1994) and the AIMR committee 
(AIMR 1993) explicitly called for more detailed segment information (i.e., more disaggregated information). This 
suggests that both standard setters and user groups view segment disaggregation as useful for investors. 
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H2: In the post-SFAS 131 period, FERC of firms that increase the number of 
reported geographic segments is greater than FERC of firms that do not 
increase the number of reported geographic segments. 
 
As discussed previously, another notable change of SFAS 131 is the lack of a 
requirement for the disclosure of earnings for enterprise-wide geographic segments. Only 
revenues and assets are required disclosures. Although not the only factor, earnings are the single 
most important explanation of firms’ stock returns over the long run and a significant 
determinant even in the short run (e.g., Givoly, Hayn, and D’Souza 1999).  Therefore, consistent 
with prior research that links disclosure quality with the ability of financial analysts and investors 
to predict firm performance (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lundholm and Myers 2002; Gelb 
and Zarowin 2002), we expect investors to face reduced uncertainty by having access to earnings 
reported by geographic segment. Hence, we expect FERC to increase in the disclosure of 
geographic earnings: 
 
H3: In the post-SFAS 131 period, FERC of firms that include performance 
measures in geographic segment disclosures is greater than FERC of firms that 
do not include performance measures in geographic segment disclosures. 
 
 
H1-H3 test whether FERC is increasing in geographic segment disclosures. Results 
supporting these hypotheses would be consistent with conclusions in Aboody, Hughes, and Liu 
(2002). They show that when mispricing occurs, earnings response coefficients are biased 
downwards. As investors’ mispricing diminishes, the current returns/current earnings relation 
increases and ERCs will be higher. Thus, finding a higher FERC with improved geographic 
disclosures is consistent with reduced mispricing of foreign earnings. As a final hypothesis, we 
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directly test for the mispricing of foreign earnings around adoption of SFAS 131 using the 
Mishkin (1983) test: 
 
H4: Investors’ mispricing of foreign earnings is mitigated by the adoption of SFAS 
131. 
 
 
 
3. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 In this section, we describe how we compute the earnings and abnormal stock return 
variables. We then explain our sample selection and discuss descriptive statistics.  
 
3.1 Earnings measures 
The SEC mandates the disclosure of pre-tax earnings and taxes for both domestic and 
foreign operations. Using the Compustat Annual database (both active and research firms), we 
compute foreign earnings as pretax foreign income (#273) adjusted for foreign taxes where 
foreign taxes are measured as the sum of foreign income taxes (#64) and deferred foreign taxes 
(#270).  Domestic earnings are the difference between pretax domestic income (#272) and 
domestic taxes (total income taxes (#16) less foreign taxes). We then compute earnings changes 
by differencing the earnings measures. To facilitate cross-sectional and temporal comparisons, 
we standardize the foreign and domestic earnings changes by stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.11   
                                                 
11
 Inferences are not affected if we instead scale by lagged or average total assets. 
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3.2 Abnormal stock return measure 
We follow a procedure similar to Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) to compute abnormal 
stock returns.  We extract stock returns inclusive of dividends from the CRSP monthly returns 
file. If the firm is delisted during a specific month, we use the delisting return provided by CRSP, 
if it is available. To compute annual abnormal returns for the current fiscal year, we proceed as 
follows. First, we require that 36 monthly returns preceding the current fiscal year are available 
to estimate the market model parameters. The market model is estimated using CRSP value-
weighted market returns. Second, we cumulate the monthly returns starting the fourth month 
after the previous fiscal year end month and ending three months after the termination of the 
current fiscal year:  
12
, ,
1
ˆ
ˆ(1 ( )) 1.it i j i i m j
j
UR R Rα β
=
= + − − −∏   
UR is the current cumulative abnormal annual return, 
,i jR is the raw monthly return for 
firm i  month j , ˆiα  and ˆiβ  are the firm-specific parameters of the market model estimated over 
the previous 36 months, and 
,m jR is the CRSP value-weighted monthly market return 
corresponding to month j.12 
 
3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Our sample period spans the period from 1985 to 2002 and the sample selection 
procedures follow Bodnar and Weintrop (1997). We include only firms incorporated in the 
                                                 
12
 As alternative specifications we have used (1) raw returns, (2) value-weighted market-adjusted returns, and (3) 
size-adjusted returns. We have also required 60 months of returns for the market model estimation. Results are 
similar with these alternative specifications of annual returns. 
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United States with both current and lagged observations for domestic and foreign pre-tax annual 
income. We also require that data are available for current and lagged income taxes. These 
restrictions yield a sample of 17,676 firm-year observations (2,805 firms). Requiring stock 
returns from CRSP reduces the sample to 14,972 observations (2,476 firms). After imposing 
necessary requirements on the availability of stock returns in order to compute the market model 
parameters, we have a sample of 11,503 observations (1,939 firms). Finally, in order to ensure 
that our results are not driven by extreme observations, we eliminate the top and bottom half 
percentile of standardized domestic and foreign earnings changes. After imposing these data 
constraints the final sample for the earnings response coefficient tests of H1 consists of 11,328 
observations (1,925 firms). For tests of H2 and H3, we have a total of 3,663 observations (1,211 
firms) for the post-SFAS 131 period.13 Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our sample selection 
procedures. Panel B shows that approximately 24% of the sample firms increase the number of 
geographic segments and 35% include at least one performance measure in the geographic 
segment disclosure when they adopt SFAS 131. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. 
As sample firms are multinationals, they are relatively large, with a median (mean) market value 
of equity of $338 million ($2.5 billion) for the pre-SFAS 131 period and $582 million ($3.8 
billion) for the post-SFAS 131 period. By comparison, the median (mean) market value of all 
Compustat firms for the entire sample period is $70 million ($1.2 billion). Foreign revenues as a 
percent of total revenues have median values of 26% and 35% in the pre and post period, 
respectively, illustrating the importance of foreign operations for the average sample firm. As in 
Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), the median growth rate of foreign sales exceeds that of domestic 
                                                 
13
 Specifically, if a firm has December fiscal year end, then the post-SFAS 131 period starts with fiscal year 1998, 
otherwise the post period starts with fiscal year 1999. Our post-SFAS 131 sample period ends in fiscal year 2002. 
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sales in both periods, consistent with foreign markets exhibiting greater average growth 
opportunities than domestic markets do. The median (mean) number of geographic segments 
disclosed increases from 2 (2.63) in the pre period to 3 (3.44) in the post period. Both the 
increase in median and mean are significant at the 1% level (untabulated), suggesting that SFAS 
131 brought about significant increases in geographic segment disclosure.  
 Panel B of Table 2 presents Pearson correlations among the dependent variable, test 
variables, and selected control variables. Pre- (post-) SFAS 131 correlations are presented above 
(below) the diagonal. Domestic and foreign earnings changes are significantly correlated with 
abnormal returns in both the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. Domestic earnings changes have a 
higher correlation with abnormal returns before SFAS 131, whereas foreign earnings changes 
have a higher correlation with abnormal returns after SFAS 131. Domestic and foreign earnings 
changes are moderately positively correlated.14 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we first briefly discuss our research design before reporting the results of 
our hypotheses tests, including a number of sensitivity analyses. These tests center on whether 
FERC is an increasing function of disclosures related to foreign operations. In addition we 
conduct Mishkin (1983) tests to examine whether the underpricing of foreign earnings decreases 
with such disclosure.  
An important feature of our research design is that we conduct two different types of tests 
for H1-H3. First, for H1 we conduct “before versus after” (i.e., times-series) tests to examine 
whether the pricing of foreign earnings is associated with the introduction of SFAS 131. Second, 
                                                 
14
 We have computed variance inflation factors (VIF) for all regressions presented. The highest VIF is 2, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not an issue in our estimation. In addition, untabulated Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics show 
that there is no significant autocorrelation in our regression tests (i.e., all DW statistics are around 1.86). 
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for H2 and H3 we perform cross-sectional tests of whether the pricing of foreign earnings varies 
with geographic segment disclosure practices post SFAS 131.  
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), potential endogeneity is the main limitation of 
disclosure studies. The primary advantage of the before versus after test (H1) is that it does not 
suffer from this potential endogeneity, as the reporting change we study is mandatory (Piotroski 
2003b). However, the challenge in time-series tests is to control for potential confounding 
events. For this reason, we include controls for a number of potentially important variables that 
might differ in the pre versus post periods (described in detail below). We also report results 
using three different samples to minimize the possibility that results are caused by unknown 
omitted factors. 
In our second set of tests (H2 and H3), we conduct cross-sectional tests of variations in 
disclosure practices in the post SFAS 131 period. Thus, there are no time-period effects and 
consequently less of a concern with confounding events. Given that firms likely do not choose 
their disclosure strategies randomly, we control for self-selection effects for the cross-sectional 
tests. 
As our research design relates to that of Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), we first estimate a 
regression of unexpected returns on the change in domestic (DomEarn) and foreign (ForEarn) 
earnings to compare our results to theirs:15  
i,t 11 12 i,t 13 i,t i,tUR  =  +  DomEarn   +  ForEarn  + β β β ε∆ ∆                          (1) 
Table 3 reports the results of this test as well as regressions of abnormal returns on either the 
change in domestic earnings or the change in foreign earnings. Consistent with Bodnar and 
Weintrop (1997), both the domestic and foreign ERCs are positive and significant at less than the 
                                                 
15
 As a sensitivity test we have re-run our tests using total and foreign earnings changes instead of domestic and 
foreign earnings changes and find similar results (compare the discussion in Bodnar and Weintrop 1997, 81-83). 
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1% level, suggesting that investors view both earnings streams as value relevant. In addition, an 
untabulated F-test shows that, consistent with Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), the estimated 
coefficient on ForEarn is significantly larger than the coefficient on DomEarn, suggesting that 
the value of the firm is more sensitive to changes in foreign income than it is to changes in 
domestic income.  
 
4.1 Tests of H1 
To test whether FERC is higher after SFAS 131 (H1) we use the following model: 
i,t 21 22 23 i,t 24 i,t 25 i,t i,tUR  =  + SFAS131 + DomEarn  + ForEarn  +  SFAS131* ForEarn  +  β β β β β ε∆ ∆ ∆ (2) 
where SFAS131 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods after SFAS 131 is 
effective and the value of zero otherwise.16 Considering that SFAS 131 covers a variety of 
disclosures and is not exclusively related to foreign operations, it is possible that the value 
relevance of domestic earnings also increases with SFAS 131. In particular, many firms 
increased the number of industrial segments reported upon adopting SFAS 131 (Berger and 
Hann 2003a). Although we control for domestic earnings in our empirical tests, as sensitivity 
analyses we further report results of tests where we interact the SFAS 131 dummy with domestic 
earnings. We report similar specifications for all subsequent main tests. 
We present results using three different samples. First, we estimate the regressions using 
the full sample pre and post SFAS 131 (“Full Sample”). Using this full sample increases the 
power of our tests and minimizes the effect that any one year’s (possibly unrepresentative) data 
might have on our results (Ettredge et al. 2005). Second, to address the concern that the first 
sample has an unequal representation in the two time periods and to increase the internal validity 
                                                 
16
 Regressions are estimated using firm fixed effects. 
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of our tests (as other things may change as well over our sample period), we restrict the test to an 
equal number of years (i.e., four years) before and after the new standard (“Balanced Sample”). 
Finally, we use a fixed sample of firms four years pre and four years post SFAS 131 (“Fixed 
Sample”). By using a constant sample, concerns over correlated omitted variables are partially 
alleviated.17 
The results are reported in Table 4. Both DomEarn and ForEarn are positive and 
significant. The focus, however, is on the interaction term between ForEarn and the indicator 
variable for SFAS 131. For all three samples, the estimated coefficient on this interaction is 
positive and significant at the 2% level or better (two-sided tests), supporting the notion that 
foreign earnings are valued more following the new standard. This finding suggests that the 
disclosure required by SFAS 131 improves the overall disclosure related to foreign operations, 
consistent with a reduction in the valuation discount. The results of the regression specification 
which includes an interaction between DomEarn and SFAS131 are similar. The interaction 
with foreign earnings remains positive and significant. The interaction with domestic earnings is, 
however, small in magnitude and statistically insignificant for the first two samples, and 
marginally significant for the fixed sample.18 
SFAS 131 is unique in that it is the first standard to specifically address financial 
analysts’ complaints (Botosan and Stanford 2005). Street et al. (2000) emphasize the importance 
of improved consistency in segment reporting following SFAS 131. They state that with the 
“management approach” required by SFAS 131, external parties can now “see through the eyes 
                                                 
17
 The disadvantages of using a constant sample are that we impose survivorship bias and that we potentially lower 
the power of our tests due to the smaller sample size. 
18
 We do not have any predictions regarding the interaction between SFAS 131 and domestic earnings. On one hand, 
SFAS 131 clearly includes several disclosure improvements that could affect the pricing of domestic earnings. On 
the other hand, Thomas (1999) did not find any mispricing related to domestic earnings, suggesting that the 
uncertainty faced by investors was considerably less than that for foreign earnings. 
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of management.” As a result, investors face less uncertainty and consequently apply a lower 
“uncertainty discount” to foreign earnings post SFAS 131. Our findings are consistent with 
Street et al.’s (2000) conclusion that under SFAS 131 foreign business reporting has improved.  
 
4.2. Sensitivity analyses for H1 
We conduct several robustness tests. In particular, we consider the effects that firm 
performance, the percentage of foreign revenues, growth, firm size, structural changes, changes 
in investor composition, and non-linearities may have on our conclusion that FERC varies with 
geographic disclosures. The results of these tests are reported in Table 5. Additional sensitivity 
analyses are described below. 
 
4.2.1. Controlling for foreign profit margin, percentage of foreign revenues, growth, firm 
size, and firm performance  
In our first robustness test, we include controls for four factors potentially affecting our 
regression results: foreign profit margin, percentage of foreign revenues, firm size, and 
differential growth rates. First, earnings coefficients may differ over time because of differences 
in profitability (e.g., Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). If foreign operations are more 
profitable for firms after adoption of SFAS 131, then higher earnings coefficients are expected 
and previously reported conclusions are confounded. Second, it is possible that investors pay 
more attention to foreign earnings when these operations are more important for a given firm (as 
measured by percent foreign revenues), which in turn could affect the pricing of foreign 
earnings. In Panel A of Table 2, we show that foreign revenues comprise a larger percentage of 
total revenues in the post-SFAS 131 period compared with the pre-SFAS 131 period, suggesting 
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that it is potentially important to control for the relative magnitude of foreign operations in our 
tests. Third, earnings response coefficients may vary with firm size, as firm size relates to overall 
disclosure level (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996) and the extent of sophisticated investor 
following (Thomas 2004; Callen et al. 2005). Finally, differential revenue growth between 
domestic and foreign operations may also explain differences in earnings response coefficients 
(Bodnar and Weintrop 1997).19 After controlling for the foreign profit margin, percentage of 
foreign revenues, firm size, and differential growth rates, we find that none of the reported 
results is materially affected (see Panel A of Table 5).20 That is, the control variables have either 
weak or no association with FERC and the interaction between SFAS131 and FERC remains 
positive and significant at the 1% level for the full sample and for the fixed sample, and is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for the balanced sample. These findings suggest that our 
results are not due to lack of control for profitability, the relative magnitude of foreign 
operations, firm size, and growth.  
 
4.2.2. Controlling for structural changes 
Our next robustness check considers whether changes in reported segment disclosures 
resulting from activities including mergers, acquisitions, internal growth, and divestitures affect 
reported results. To ensure that our results are not driven by such corporate structural changes, 
we eliminate firms with a greater than 35% increase or decrease in total assets, as these firms are 
more likely to undergo major structural changes. Panel B of Table 5 reports that excluding these 
observations does not materially affect the reported results for any of the three samples (i.e., 
                                                 
19
 Untabulated tests show that differential growth is significantly positively correlated with future changes in foreign 
earnings (p-value < 0.01). As an alternative proxy for growth, we have used the foreign revenue growth and obtain 
consistent results. 
20
 For brevity we report these and subsequent sensitivity analyses (for H1, H2, and H3) excluding interactions with 
domestic earnings. All reported results are robust to including interactions with domestic earnings. 
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results with the smaller sample sizes are very similar to (and in fact somewhat stronger than) the 
results reported above).21 
 
4.2.3. Changes in institutional ownership over time 
The observed increase in FERC following the introduction of SFAS 131 could potentially 
be explained by changes in investor composition over time. In particular, if our sample firms 
have more “sophisticated investors” in the post-SFAS 131 period compared with the pre-SFAS 
131 period, the observed result could be due to these investors’ ability to better interpret existing 
disclosures or their improved access to alternative information (see, e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2004; 
Callen et al. 2005). Panel A of Table 2 shows that there is a significantly higher amount of 
institutional ownership in our sample firms post SFAS 131 compared with the pre period.22 Thus, 
we control for institutional ownership in regression tests. We measure institutional ownership as 
the percent of shares outstanding held by institutions from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional 
Holdings Database. Panel C of Table 5 shows that institutional ownership is insignificantly 
related to FERC and that our main result is unaffected for all three samples.23 This finding 
suggests that our results are not caused by lack of control for changes in investor composition 
over time. 
 
4.2.4. Non-linear returns-earnings specification 
It is also possible that the increase in FERC could relate to an increase in the incidence of 
positive changes in foreign earnings in the post-SFAS 131 period. Payne and Thomas (2005) 
                                                 
21
 We have repeated this test using alternative cut-offs (20% and 50%) and find similar results. As an alternative 
procedure, we follow Ettredge et al. (2005) and delete firms that report a merger, acquisition, or divestiture 
(Compustat items 129 and 66). Similar results are obtained. 
22
 The difference is significant at the 1% level assuming either equal or unequal variances for the two populations. 
23
 Results are consistent when we instead use the number of institutional investors.  
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show that the total earnings response coefficient is higher when changes in earnings are positive. 
This result could apply to the foreign component of earnings as well. To explore the potential 
effect of non-linearity in the returns-earnings specification on the effect of SFAS 131 
disclosures, we first compute descriptive statistics for domestic and foreign earnings changes in 
both the pre and post periods. These (untabulated) statistics show that there is no significant 
difference in the number of negative versus positive earnings innovations for foreign as 
compared with domestic earnings in the pre and post SFAS 131 periods. Nevertheless, we 
expand our regression specification by adding both a main effect and an interaction term for 
positive earnings innovations (as in Hope and Kang 2005). Results reported in Panel D of Table 
5 show that positive changes in foreign earnings are priced higher following the new standard. 
There is no significant change in FERC when changes in foreign earnings are negative. Finding 
significant results for positive earnings changes alone seems intuitive, as positive earnings 
changes are more persistent and therefore are more representative of future firm performance 
(Basu 1997). Similar results have been found for positive versus negative earnings levels (Hayn 
1995).24 As such, positive changes in earnings better reflect concurrent changes in firm value. 
When accounting earnings are less likely to represent investors’ valuation model (i.e., in the case 
of negative changes in earnings), then earnings coefficients have less ability to reflect 
improvements in the usefulness of accounting earnings brought about by improved disclosures. 
 
4.2.5. Additional robustness tests for H1 
Given the potential for confounding effects in time-series tests, in this section we report 
on a number of additional sensitivity tests. In particular, we consider effects of early adoption of 
                                                 
24
 We have used two different specifications for the positive earnings indicator: earnings levels and earnings 
changes. Inferences remain unaltered with both specifications. 
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SFAS 131, foreign firms listed in the U.S. and U.S. firms listed on foreign exchanges, foreign 
currency adjustments, taxes, and inter-temporal variations in foreign earnings persistence. The 
results of these tests are not tabulated for reasons of brevity but are available from the authors.  
 
Early adoption of SFAS 131 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) report that 12% of their sample firms choose to adopt 
SFAS 131 in the year before the standard became mandatory. For this reason, we re-run our tests 
excluding all observations for the transition year of December 1997 through November 1998. 
Results are similar to those reported. 
 
Effects of changes in international cross-listings 
It is conceivable that our positive and significant coefficient for SFAS 131 is related to 
the increase in the number of foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges during our sample 
period. Such an increase could imply that investors in general become more familiar with foreign 
operations and thus apply a lower valuation discount to foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals 
independent of segment disclosure levels.25 To control for this possibility, we add the number of 
foreign companies on U.S. exchanges for each year to our regression.26 No inferences are 
affected when we control for variations in foreign listings on U.S. exchanges over time. 
Another possibility is that more U.S. firms are listed on foreign stock exchanges after the 
implementation of SFAS 131 than before. Such overseas listings could attract more foreign 
investors with greater knowledge about these companies’ foreign operations. However, there are 
strong reasons to believe that this is not the case. First, few U.S. firms are listed outside the U.S 
                                                 
25
 Recall that we already control for the percent of foreign revenues in our tests. 
26
 These numbers represent the sum of direct listings and ADRs on the Amex, Nasdaq, and NYSE exchanges. We 
obtain the data from the World Federation of Exchanges (www.world-exchanges.org). 
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(e.g., Karolyi 2004; Sarkissian and Schill 2004).27 Second and more importantly, Frost and Gu 
(2004) show that there has been a marked decrease in the number of U.S. firms listed on foreign 
exchanges over our sample period.28 Thus, there is little reason to suspect that foreign listings by 
U.S. firms can explain our result. 
 
Variations in foreign exchange rates 
Foreign income changes incorporate an exchange rate effect.  However, Bodnar and 
Weintrop (1997) demonstrate that their results are not affected by changes in exchange rates. 
Similarly, Denis et al. (2002, footnote 16) state that their results and the results in prior literature 
suggest that “exchange rate volatility has little impact on the valuation effect of global 
diversification.” Nevertheless, we examine this issue two ways. First, we incorporate the 
unrecognized foreign exchange gains or losses (Compustat item 230), recorded in other 
comprehensive income, into the change in foreign earnings variable. Second, we exclude the 
foreign currency adjustment in income (Compustat item 150) from the change in foreign 
earnings. No inferences are changed when using these alternative foreign income numbers. 
 
Income taxes 
Income taxes could potentially affect the valuation of foreign earnings (e.g., Collins, 
Kemsley, and Lang 1998). Prior studies acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate tax effects 
                                                 
27
 In addition, even among those U.S. firms that are listed abroad, few actually raise capital in foreign markets. 
There is also very limited trading of these shares on the foreign exchanges (e.g., Frost and Gu 2004). Frost and Gu 
(2004) find that the advertised benefits of listing overseas, such as increased visibility through greater media 
coverage and a broader investor base, do not appear to be significant for U.S. companies. They suggest that this 
evidence might explain the steadily diminishing numbers of U.S. firms listed on foreign exchanges.   
28
 Specifically, from Table 1 in Frost and Gu (2004) that compares the years 1992 and 2000, we see that (1) the 
number of U.S. firms listed abroad decreased from 596 to 367; (2) as a percentage of firms listed on international 
exchanges, U.S. firms decreased from 5.9% to 3.0%; (3) the percentage of U.S. firms cross-listing decreases from 
9.1% to 5.3%; and (4) the percentage of U.S. firms to total foreign firms listed on international exchanges decreases 
from 22.2% to 17.1%. 
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since researchers have access to external financial statements only and not to income tax records. 
We repeat the analysis using domestic and foreign earnings before taxes and find similar results 
as those reported. Although this sensitivity analysis does not exclude the possibility that firms 
manage their pretax earnings to minimize taxes or that tax rates have changed over time, our 
robustness test alleviates the concern that our results are driven by the differential tax expense 
for domestic and foreign operations.  
 
Changes in earnings persistence 
Ceteris paribus, if the persistence of foreign earnings increases over time, one would 
expect a higher valuation multiple applied to this earnings stream. However, we document in 
Table 8 (discussed in detail later in the paper) that the persistence of foreign earnings has 
declined in the post-SFAS 131 period, whereas the persistence of domestic earnings is almost 
identical in the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. A decline in foreign earnings persistence works 
against our hypothesis that FERC will increase following adoption of SFAS 131. To empirically 
test the effects of persistence on the results, we estimate domestic and foreign earnings 
persistence using annual cross-sectional regressions and then add these estimates as control 
variables to our main tests. We do not employ firm-specific estimates of persistence as there are 
a limited number of time-series observations (foreign earnings are not provided on a quarterly 
basis). We find that results are nearly identical to those reported in Table 4. 
Collectively, the evidence presented in tables 4 and 5 and the additional sensitivity 
analyses described above suggest that SFAS 131 had a significantly positive effect on the pricing 
of foreign earnings. Although we control for a number of factors that may differ in the post 
period compared with the pre period (as well as factors that vary across companies), we 
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acknowledge, however, the possibility that our result could be related to some unknown macro 
effect. For this reason we now turn to cross-sectional tests of variations in geographic segment 
disclosure post SFAS 131. These cross-sectional tests are not subject to this limitation. 
 
4.3. Tests of H2 and H3 
For the cross-sectional tests of H2 and H3, we use only observations in the post SFAS 
131 period (except in sensitivity analyses as explained below). We first test whether FERC is 
positively associated with the change in the number of geographic segments disclosed after 
SFAS 131 (H2): 
i,t 31 32 33 i,t 34 i,t 35 i,t i,tUR  =  + GSEG + DomEarn  + ForEarn  +  GSEG* ForEarn  +  β β β β β ε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ (3) 
where GSEG is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is an increase in the 
number of geographic segments in the fiscal year in which the firm adopts SFAS 131 (zero 
otherwise).29 Panel A of Table 6 illustrates that the coefficients on domestic and foreign earnings 
changes are positive and statistically significant. As predicted, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term of GSEG and ForEarn is positive and significant at less than the 1% level. 
Firms that increase their reported number geographic segments following adoption of SFAS 131 
have a higher valuation of foreign earnings compared to those firms that report no increase.30 
The results hold when including an interaction between DomEarn and GSEG.31 
                                                 
29
 We also consider alternative specifications where GSEG is either a continuous measure or a percentage measure 
of the change in segments disclosed. No inferences are changed with these alternative specifications.  
30
 Untabulated results show that the effect on FERC is even greater for firms that increase by two or more their 
reported geographic segments. This result provides further support for the contention that increased disaggregation 
is valued by investors. 
31
 The coefficient on the interaction with foreign earnings is significantly greater than the coefficient on the 
interaction with domestic earnings. 
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We next turn to cross-sectional tests of performance measures. To determine whether 
FERC is greater for firms that include earnings in their geographic segment disclosures in the 
post-SFAS 131 period (H3), we estimate the following model: 
i,t 41 42 43 i,t 44 i,t 45 i,t i,tUR  =  +  PMEAS + DomEarn  + ForEarn  +  PMEAS* ForEarn  +  β β β β β ε∆ ∆ ∆ (4) 
where PMEAS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm discloses at least 
one performance measure in its geographic segment disclosures post SFAS 131 (zero 
otherwise).32 Results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficient on the interaction 
between ForEarn and PMEAS is positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01), which 
supports H3.33 When we add the interaction between DomEarn and PMEAS, the estimated 
coefficient is small and statistically insignificant, and other results are consistent with those 
described above. 
To investigate whether the inclusion of geographic earnings has incremental value 
relevance to investors over and above the change in the number of geographic segments 
disclosed, we estimate the following model: 
i,t 51 52 53 54 i,t 55 i,t
56 i,t 57 i,t i,t
UR = + GSEG + PMEAS + DomEarn + ForEarn
           + GSEG* ForEarn + PMEAS* ForEarn + 
β β β β β
β β ε
∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆
                 
 
(5) 
The empirical results of this regression are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The 
interactions of ForEarn with both GSEG and PMEAS are positive and significant, suggesting 
that both disclosure effects are incrementally value relevant.  
 
                                                 
32
 Specifically, the Compustat segment database classifies six measures of performance: operating income before 
depreciation, operating income after depreciation, operating income, income before extraordinary items, pretax 
income, and net income. Our performance measure takes the value 1 if the firm discloses at least one of these 
measures for its geographic segments during the year when the firm implements SFAS 131 and the fiscal year is 
post 131; otherwise it takes the value 0. Note that in our sample, if a firm discloses a particular earnings measure for 
one geographic segment, it always discloses the same measure for all its geographic segments disclosed that year.  
33
 The magnitude of the estimated coefficient (2.005) suggests that investors find disclosure of performance 
measures to be an economically important means of reducing uncertainty about foreign operations. 
 27 
4.4. Sensitivity analyses for H2 and H3 
We perform four types of sensitivity analyses. We first conduct “difference-in-
difference” tests in which we estimate regressions (3) and (4) in the pre period and test for 
differences between the two periods. Second, we check if our findings are robust to the inclusion 
of a set of control variables. Third, we examine if our results are sensitive to controlling for 
structural changes. Finally and perhaps most importantly, we perform self-selection tests.  
 
4.4.1. Difference-in-difference tests 
Our focus for the cross-sectional tests of H2 and H3 is to examine whether FERC varies 
systematically with geographic segment disclosures in the post-SFAS 131 period. However, it is 
possible that differences in FERC between firms existed before implementation of SFAS 131. 
Differences in FERC could be related to uncontrolled firm characteristics rather than to GSEG 
or PMEAS. To test for this, we estimate regressions (3) and (4) in the pre-SFAS 131 period. 
Thus, the pre-SFAS 131 period acts as a control period in our cross-sectional analysis. If 
differences in FERC existed prior to SFAS 131, then results are confounded. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows that there is no significant relation between GSEG (PMEAS) 
and FERC in the pre-SFAS 131 period. Furthermore, the table shows that the differences 
between the interaction of GSEG (PMEAS) and FERC in the post versus pre periods are 
significantly positive (at the 2% level or better). These results lend additional credence that 
evidence in support of H2 and H3 reported previously is not driven by correlated omitted 
variables. 
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4.4.2. Control variables 
We use the same set of control variables as for H1: foreign profit margin, percent foreign 
revenues, firm size, and differential growth between domestic and foreign revenues. Panel A of 
Table 7 shows that no inferences are affected after controlling for these factors. Specifically, 
whereas the interactions between the control variables and FERC are insignificant (except for the 
marginal significance of the interaction between FERC and firm size in the GSEG test), the 
interactions between GSEG and FERC (and PMEAS and FERC) remain positive and 
significant.34   
 
4.4.3. Structural changes 
If a firm doubles in size through a merger, its number of geographic segments may very 
well increase. In such a situation it is not clear that an increase in the number of geographic 
segments implies an enhanced information environment. Regarding the decision to report 
geographic performance (PMEAS), it is less clear what effect corporate structural changes would 
have. Nevertheless, similar to our H1 test, to ensure that our results are not driven by corporate 
structural changes, we eliminate firms with a greater than 35% increase or decrease in total 
assets.35 Panel B of Table 7 shows that results for H2 and H3 are similar after eliminating firms 
that undergo major structural changes. 
 
                                                 
34
 As an additional sensitivity analysis, we have included the number of line-of-business segments both as an 
additional control variable and interacted with domestic and foreign earnings. Results (untabulated) are similar to 
those reported and all inferences remain the same. 
35
 Similar to the H1 test, we have re-run this test using alternative cut-offs and also employed the Ettredge et al. 
(2005) technique of using Compustat data items to identify mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures. 
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4.4.4. Selection tests 
Results to this point are consistent with increased geographic segment disclosures leading 
to higher valuations for foreign earnings. However, one possible concern is that disclosure 
choices under SFAS 131 are potentially endogenous to the model. Firms’ decisions on whether 
to increase the number of geographic segments and/or to disclose performance measures for each 
geographic segment are affected not only by the mandated requirements of SFAS 131, but also 
by voluntary decisions related to the tradeoff between the proprietary costs of these additional 
disclosures and the potential valuation benefits resulting from mitigating the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors and/or between different investors.36,37 Hence, our 
conclusions may suffer from self-selection biases. That is, firms’ decisions to increase the 
number of geographic segments and/or include performance measures may be caused by a host 
of other factors. And it could be these other factors, rather than an improved geographic segment 
disclosure, that lead to differences in earnings response coefficients.  
To address endogeneity issues due to self-selection, we follow a similar research design 
as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and use a two-stage Heckman (1979) estimation approach. In the 
first stage, we use Probit estimation to model the decision to increase the number of geographic 
segments disclosed or to disclose geographic earnings after adoption of SFAS 131. In the second 
                                                 
36
 To ensure that the inclusion of performance measures is voluntary and not mandated by SFAS 131 (i.e., that the 
geographic segments are not operating segments), we have re-run tests after excluding (the small number of) firms 
that disclose capital expenditures and depreciation (both required for operating segments). No inferences are 
affected by eliminating these observations. 
37
 The choice of the number of geographic segments to disclose is affected by the mandates of SFAS 131 as well as 
management’s strategic considerations. Our view is that the number of geographic segments disclosed is largely a 
voluntary decision. 
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stage, we estimate equations (3) to (6) after controlling for the inverse Mills ratios computed 
using the first stage results.38  
 In the Probit models, we introduce variables that proxy for external demands to reduce 
information asymmetries between managers and users of financial statements and among 
investors.39 Following Cohen (2004), we compute a variable OWNER defined as the (industry-
adjusted) natural logarithm of the number of common shareholders. We also include a variable, 
ASYMMETRY, which measures the asymmetry of information between managers and analysts 
(Botosan and Harris 2000). This variable is computed as the coefficient of variation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts from three months before the announcement of annual earnings as reported by 
I/B/E/S.  As a proxy for the information asymmetry among investors, we use the probability of 
informed trade (PIN). The PIN, which was developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997) and 
which has been widely used in recent research (e.g., Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo 2004; Botosan, 
Plumlee, and Xie 2004; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 2002), is a firm-specific estimate of the 
probability that a specific trade originates from a privately-informed investor, and hence, directly 
captures the extent of information asymmetry among investors in the secondary market (Brown 
et al. 2004).40 
 Highly indebted firms may be under greater pressure to disclose more since debtholders 
need more information for monitoring. We compute LEVERAGE as total liabilities (#181) 
divided by total assets (#6). In addition, we include the current ratio (current assets #4 divided by 
                                                 
38
 We estimate the Probit models cross-sectionally every year post SFAS 131 adoption to compute annual inverse 
Mills ratios. A complete description of this research methodology, including the computation of the inverse Mills 
ratio, can be found in Maddala (1983).  
39
 We do not include variables that are derived from market returns since returns are the dependent variable in the 
second stage. 
40
 We obtain the PIN data from http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/. 
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current liabilities #5) as a proxy for LIQUIDITY.41 Low liquidity firms may be under different 
pressures to disclose than are other firms. 
 As proxies for proprietary costs of disclosure, we include a measure of capital intensity 
(CAPIT), computed as (industry-adjusted) capital expenditures (#128) divided by net sales (#12), 
and the Herfindahl Index (HERF). Following the extant literature, we include the industry 
concentration ratio (HERF) to control for the effects of industry-specific competition on 
disclosure (Berger and Hann 2003b; Verrecchia 1983).  HERF equals 2
1
( / )n ii s S=  where: si is 
the segment’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all segments in an industry (defined by 2-digit 
SIC code) and n is the number of firms (segments) in the industry. To obtain a firm-specific 
measure of this index, we compute the weighted average across firms’ segments using the 
segments’ sales as weights.  
We control for future growth opportunities with the market-to-book ratio (MB) and for 
firm performance with return on equity (ROE) as well as domestic and foreign profit margins 
(PM_DOM, PM_FOR) since previous research associates firm performance with disclosure 
strategies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996). Finally, we control for SIZE using the natural 
logarithm of total assets (#6).  
We thus estimate separately in the first stage the following two Probit models for our two 
disclosure choices:  
GSEGi,t (PMEASi,t) = 11 + 12 OWNERi,t + 13 ASYMMETRYi,t + 14 PINi,t + 
15 LEVERAGEi,t + 16 LIQUIDi,t + 17 CAPITi,t + 18 HERFi,t + 19 MBi,t + 
1 10 ROEi,t + 1 11 PM_DOMi,t + 1 12 PM_FORi,t + 1 13 SIZEi,t + i,t 
 
(6) 
 
                                                 
41
 As alternative measures of liquidity, we use (1) working capital divided by total assets and (2) cash flow from 
operating activities divided by net sales and obtain similar results. 
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In the second stage, we estimate regressions (3) and (4) and control for the inverse Mills 
ratios computed from the first stage.  
 Table 8 presents the empirical results of estimating these self-selection models.42 Both 
first-stage models are significant, with Likelihood Ratio p-values of <0.001 and 0.013, 
respectively. For the GSEG model, ASYMMETRY, CAPIT, MB, and SIZE are significant 
explanatory variables. For the PMEAS model, MB and PM_FOR are significant. More 
importantly, the second-stage results are consistent with our main test results. That is, both 
GSEG and PMEAS are positively associated with FERC after controlling for self-selection 
bias. 
 Our results for SFAS 131 per se (H1), change in the number of geographic segments 
(H2), and inclusion of performance measures in geographic segment disclosures (H3) are 
consistent with prior research showing that segment disclosures may enhance security valuation 
(e.g., Kinney 1971; Tse 1989).43 Our results may also be consistent with reduced mispricing 
from SFAS 131 disclosures (Aboody et al. 2002), which we examine formally in our mispricing 
tests next. 
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 The reported first-stage results are for Probit models corresponding to the year of SFAS 131 adoption. Results for 
the other post SFAS 131 years are similar and are available upon request. The second-stage results are robust to also 
including interactions with domestic earnings. 
43
 In a previous version of this paper, we combined the tests for H1 and H2-H3 into the same regressions. The results 
of these alternative specifications are as follows. First, all results are consistent with those reported here. Second, we 
find that both GSEG and PMEAS have incremental value relevance over and beyond the general benefits provided 
by SFAS 131. Specifically, when either GSEG or PMEAS is included in the regression along with the SFAS131 
dummy, both GSEG (or PMEAS) and SFAS131 are positive and significant. Furthermore, when all three variables 
are included in the same regression, both GSEG and PMEAS are positive and significant whereas SFAS131 is 
positive but not significant at conventional levels. The latter result could be interpreted as follows. Geographic 
segment disclosures, including the reporting of performance measures, dominate the overall effect of the 
introduction of SFAS 131. Alternatively, the lack of significance could reflect the low power of the test stemming 
from partitioning the sample into small sub-groups. Finally, Ettredge et al. (2005), who report similar regressions 
that combine time-series and cross-sectional tests, interpret the insignificant coefficient on their SFAS131 variable 
to mean that there were no macro changes contemporaneous to SFAS 131 that caused earnings response coefficients 
to increase. 
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4.5. Mispricing tests 
To test directly whether investors’ mispricing of foreign earnings as documented by 
Thomas (1999) is mitigated with SFAS 131 geographic segment disclosures (H4), we employ the 
Mishkin (1983) framework.  
The Mishkin test determines whether the market rationally prices the foreign and 
domestic earnings components.44  As in Thomas (1999), we estimate simultaneously (1) the 
forecasting equation for total earnings changes and (2) the rational pricing equation for abnormal 
earnings changes, using nonlinear least squares for the pooled sample:  
i,t+1 0 i,t i,t i,t+1
* *
i,t+1 71 72 i,t+1 0 i,t i,t i,t+1
Earn  =  + DomEarn  + ForEarn  +  
AR =  + ( Earn  -  - DomEarn  - ForEarn ) +   
D F
D F
α α α
β β α α α
∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆
  (7) 
In the above equations, Earni,t+1  is total earnings change next year, DomEarni,t  and 
ForEarni,t are the domestic and foreign earnings changes in the current year, and ARi,t+1 is the 
abnormal return one year ahead. Market efficiency imposes the constraints that *D Dα α=  and 
*
F Fα α= . These nonlinear restrictions imply that stock prices impound correctly the persistence 
of total earnings changes that is attributable to both domestic and foreign earnings changes.45  
To ensure comparability with the extant literature, we modify the computation of returns 
from the previous section. Adjusting the raw returns with expected returns from the market 
model can generate unwanted correlations with the earnings numbers from previous periods over 
which the parameters of the model are estimated. Following Sloan (1996), we use size-adjusted 
                                                 
44
 More comprehensive discussions can be found in Sloan (1996), Dechow and Sloan (1997), and Thomas (1999). 
The Mishkin test has certain limitations (see, e.g., Kraft et al. 2005). We view the Mishkin test as a complement to 
our ERC tests. In other words, we do not rely on the results of Mishkin tests alone. In addition, we follow Thomas 
(1999) who uses a changes specification. Such a specification is likely a stronger test of mispricing than is a levels 
test.  
45
 Market efficiency is tested using a likelihood ratio statistic that is distributed 2 ( )qχ  and is equal to 2n Log 
(SSRc/SSRu) where q is the number of constraints, n is the number of observations, SSRc is the sum of squared 
residuals for the constrained system, and SSRu is the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained system. 
 34 
stock returns.46 We scale earnings changes by average total assets and control for influential 
observations that may drive the results by eliminating all observations that have scaled earnings 
changes greater than 0.25, as in Thomas (1999).47 These requirements result in a sample of 
10,528 observations for the Mishkin test. 
We estimate the system of equations separately for both the pre- and post-SFAS 131 
periods. The results of these tests are reported in Table 9. The results for the pre-SFAS 131 
period are comparable to those reported in Thomas (1999, Table 2, Panel B). The difference in 
the domestic earnings coefficients ( * 0.051D Dα α− = − ) is not significant (with a p-value of 
0.342), while the difference in the foreign earnings coefficients ( * 0.451F Fα α− = ) is significant 
(p-value 0.004). These results suggest that investors rationally price domestic earnings changes, 
whereas investors discount foreign earnings changes even though they exhibit a lower mean 
reversal than domestic earnings. Specifically, stock prices underestimate the extent to which 
changes in foreign earnings persist (see Thomas 1999, 253) in the pre-SFAS 131 period. In the 
post-SFAS 131 period (1999 to 2002), however, the differences in domestic coefficients or 
foreign earnings coefficients are economically small and insignificant (with p-values of 0.889 
and 0.921, respectively). These results are consistent with the notion that improved disclosure 
related to foreign operations can mitigate the mispricing of foreign earnings.  
We do not report results of similar tests for comparing firms that increase geographic 
segments versus those that do not and for firms that include performance measures in geographic 
segments versus those that do not because the small sample sizes post SFAS 131 do not allow for 
a reliable estimation when slicing the sample.  
                                                 
46
 Specifically, we compute abnormal returns by subtracting from the raw returns the value-weighted returns of the 
size decile portfolios provided by CRSP, where the size decile membership is determined at the time when returns 
start cumulating (i.e., three months after the fiscal year end). 
47
 This outlier screening reduces the sample by 2.9%. Inferences are not affected if we do not delete extreme 
observations. 
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Overall, we find clear evidence that the mispricing of foreign earnings is decreasing in 
the level of foreign operations disclosures. It is somewhat reassuring that standard setters 
mandate, and firms provide, information to investors that is useful in correcting the mispricing of 
foreign earnings. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Prior research conjectures that poor disclosure of foreign operations may cause investors 
to discount foreign earnings.  The recent mandate of SFAS 131 brought about significant 
changes in the disclosure of information related to geographic segments and therefore foreign 
earnings.  Not all of these changes are mandatory. In fact, some of them are simply suggested 
disclosures. Our study investigates whether the additional disclosures mandated or suggested 
under SFAS 131 have led to incremental pricing of foreign earnings components and thereby to 
some extent corrected the underpricing documented in prior research. Specifically, we document 
that the foreign earnings response coefficient is increasing in (1) the introduction of SFAS 131, 
(2) an increase in the number of geographic segments disclosed, and (3) the inclusion of 
performance measures in geographic segments. These results are robust to a number of 
sensitivity analyses and provide standard setters with evidence supporting the benefit of such 
disclosures. 
In addition to our tests of the effect of enhanced disclosure on the foreign earnings 
response coefficient, we present results of mispricing based on the Mishkin (1983) test. The 
results indicate that the mispricing disappears following the introduction of SFAS 131. One 
caveat is that we have few observations post SFAS 131, which makes the estimation of these 
tests unreliable for subsamples of firms based on the change in the number of geographic 
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segments and the inclusion of earnings in geographic segment disclosures. We believe that such 
retesting of market mispricing based on changes in the information environment of a firm has a 
wide variety of applications in accounting and finance research. 
Our study is the first to establish a link between geographic segment disclosures and the 
valuation of foreign earnings. Our results are consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996), 
Lundholm and Myers (2002), and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) who conclude that disclosure quality 
is linked to the ability of investors to predict firm performance. More generally, our findings 
provide support for FASB’s view that the adoption of SFAS 131 and its resulting disaggregation 
of segment data would have capital market benefits (Berger and Hann 2003b). In addition, we 
provide evidence that reinforces equity investors’ contention that such disclosures are value 
relevant.48  
Diamond (1985) argues in favor of the welfare role of public disclosure because it 
obviates the need for each individual investor to expend resources on costly information 
gathering. In other words, disclosure essentially turns private information into public 
information.49 With respect to voluntary disclosure of performance measures in geographic 
segments, our findings indicate that investors find such disclosures to be value relevant. Critics 
of SFAS 131 have argued that the lack of mandatory earnings disclosure is one of the 
shortcomings of SFAS 131. 
 
                                                 
48
 According to FASB’s Conceptual Framework (FASB 1980), relevance and reliability are the prime characteristics 
of accounting information. With respect to reliability, enhanced geographic segment disclosures could increase 
verifiability because they provide additional information related to foreign operations (Ettredge et al. 2005). In 
addition, the documented improved consistency in reporting following SFAS 131 likely enhances the reliability of 
segment disclosures. However, given that geographic earnings are not required to be disclosed and that firms that 
choose to disclose may use either GAAP or non-GAAP performance metrics, we do not draw conclusions regarding 
reliability. 
49
 In the models of Merton (1987) and Fishman and Hagerty (1989), disclosure reduces the cost of becoming 
informed, thereby increasing the pool of potential investors and lowering the firm’s cost of capital. Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) provide a comprehensive review of this stream of research. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Sample Size 
Description of the Data Firms Obs. 
Sample of Compustat firms incorporated in the U.S. with per share 
foreign and domestic earnings available (computed following Bodnar 
and Weintrop 1997). We require also that the two measures are available 
for the previous year. 
2,805 17,676 
Sample with available return data (twelve-month returns compounded to 
three months after the fiscal year end) 
2,476 14,972 
Sample with available earnings and price data as well as return data to 
compute the parameters of the market model (36 months of data before 
the current year are required). (We require that current year and previous 
year earnings and previous year end stock price are available) 
1,939 11,503 
Final sample for H1 tests after eliminating observations in top and 
bottom half percentile of the earnings variables (change in domestic and 
foreign earnings scaled by beginning stock price) 
1,925 11,328 
Post SFAS 131 final sample for H2 and H3 tests after eliminating 
observations in top and bottom half percentile of the earnings variables 
(change in domestic and foreign earnings scaled by beginning stock 
price).  
1,211 3,663 
Panel B: Sample Structure   
Percentage of firms that increase the number of geographic segments  
when adopting SFAS 131 
23.78% 
Percentage of firms that disclose at least one performance (or earnings)  
measure when adopting SFAS131 
35.03% 
 
 42 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Pre SFAS 131 N Median Mean Q1 Q3 
Market value (millions) 7,665 338.1 2,510.3 67.1 1,610.9 
UR 7,665 -0.076 -0.001 -0.296 0.167 
∆Foreign earnings 7,665 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.008 
∆Domestic earnings 7,665 0.002 0.010 -0.025 0.028 
Foreign revenue  7,467 0.233 0.258 0.091 0.395 
Foreign revenue growth  6,142 0.102 0.167 -0.017 0.251 
Domestic revenue growth  7,474 0.069 0.091 -0.016 0.168 
Number of geographic segments 7,665 2.000 2.630 2.000 3.000 
Percent of shares owned by institutions   6,325 0.445 0.419 0.251 0.591 
      
Post SFAS 131 N Median Mean Q1 Q3 
Market value (millions) 3,663 582.1 3,773.5 122.3 2,519.9 
UR 3,663 -0.098 0.127 -0.387 0.366 
∆Foreign earnings 3,663 0.001 0.002 -0.007 0.008 
∆Domestic earnings 3,663 -0.002 0.002 -0.031 0.022 
Foreign revenue  3,122 0.334 0.349 0.196 0.479 
Foreign revenue growth  2,972 0.043 0.169 -0.083 0.231 
Domestic revenue growth  3,376 0.025 0.058 -0.094 0.146 
Number of geographic segments 3,663 3.000 3.440 2.000 4.000 
Percent of shares owned by institutions   3,114 0.532 0.479 0.301 0.673 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample Correlations (pre SFAS 131 above diagonal, post SFAS 131 below diagonal) 
 UR ∆Domestic 
earnings 
∆Foreign 
earnings 
Market 
value 
PM 
domestic 
PM 
foreign ∆GSEG 
UR - 0.259*** 0.139*** -0.022** -0.006 0.016 - 
∆Domestic earnings 0.113*** - 0.211*** -0.047*** 0.018 0.006 - 
∆Foreign earnings 0.151*** 0.091*** - -0.037*** -0.026** 0.004 - 
Market value 0.009 -0.018 -0.003 - 0.025** -0.005 - 
PM domestic 0.026 0.036** 0.053*** 0.041** - 0.003 - 
PM foreign 0.015 0.019 0.068*** 0.106*** -0.012 - - 
∆GSEG 0.051*** 0.003 0.017 0.048*** 0.041** 0.019 - 
PMEAS 0.003 0.001 0.012 -0.009 0.039** 0.012 0.083*** 
 
 
 
Panel A: UR is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The parameters of the market model are 
estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market returns. The monthly 
returns are cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and ending three months 
after the termination of the current fiscal year. Foreign (Domestic) earnings is the change in per share after tax 
foreign earnings (domestic earnings) scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous year. Foreign revenue is 
foreign revenues as collected from the Compustat segment data divided by total revenues. Foreign (domestic) 
revenue growth is year-over-year percentage change in foreign (domestic) revenues.  
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. PM is profit margin computed as foreign (domestic) after tax 
earnings divided by foreign (domestic) revenues. ∆GSEG is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the 
observation is post SFAS 131 and belongs to a firm that increased the number of geographic segments post SFAS 
131 (zero otherwise). PMEAS is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation is post SFAS 131 
and belongs to a firm that discloses at least one performance (earnings) measure post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise).  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively. 
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Table 3: Regressions of Unexpected Stock Returns on Changes in Total, Domestic and Foreign Earnings 
 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.040*** 6.00 0.040*** 5.99      0.040*** 5.93      0.040*** 6.01 
DomEarn   0.827*** 18.74        0.754*** 16.84 
ForEarn     1.555*** 11.88      1.140*** 8.66 
         
N 11,328  11,328  11,328  11,328  
Adj R2  0.035  0.030  0.012  0.036  
         
 
Regressions are run using firm fixed-effects estimation. The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The 
parameters of the market model are estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market returns. The monthly returns are 
cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and ending three months after the termination of the current fiscal year. DomEarn 
(ForEarn) is the change in per share after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively.  
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Table 4: Impact of the adoption of SFAS 131 on the foreign ERC (H1) 
 Full Sample Balanced Sample Fixed Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.040*** 6.02 0.040*** 6.02 0.029***  3.01 0.029*** 3.02 0.013 1.05  0.013 1.06 
SFAS131 0.133*** 7.22 0.132*** 7.20 0.155***  6.93 0.154*** 6.91 0.151*** 6.33  0.150*** 6.26 
DomEarn 0.764*** 17.09 0.716*** 13.31 0.834*** 12.27 0.778*** 7.50 0.845*** 6.68  0.551*** 2.74 
ForEarn 0.846*** 5.50 0.875*** 5.65 1.078***  4.23 1.114*** 4.28 1.160*** 2.70  1.284*** 2.95 
DomEarn * SFAS131   0.158 1.62   0.095 0.69   0.488* 1.88 
ForEarn * SFAS131 1.134*** 3.83 1.065*** 3.56 0.888**   2.34 0.838** 2.16 2.227*** 3.70  1.973*** 3.20 
             
N 11,328  11,328  7,098  7,098   2,520  2,520  
Adj R2  0.042  0.042  0.041  0.041  0.067  0.068  
     
    
    
 
Regressions are run using firm fixed-effects estimation. The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The 
parameters of the market model are estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market returns. The monthly returns are 
cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and ending three months after the termination of the current fiscal year. DomEarn 
(ForEarn) is the change in per share after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. SFAS131 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation is post SFAS 131 and zero otherwise.  Full Sample refers to the entire sample period, Balanced 
Sample has only 4 years prior and 4 years after SFAS131 adoption observations, Fixed Sample has only firms that have data 4 years before and 4 years after 
SFAS 131 adoption. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively.  
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analyses for H1 
Panel A: Controls for  foreign operations profit margin, foreign revenue percentage, firm size, and 
differential sales growth 
 Full Sample Balanced Sample Fixed Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.040*** 5.55 0.049*** 4.51 0.029** 2.08 
SFAS131 0.240*** 10.69 0.249*** 8.84 0.193*** 6.56 
PM 0.001 0.62 0.001 0.63 -0.002 -0.12 
FShare -0.006 -0.07 -0.064 -0.45 0.253* 1.79 
Size -0.211*** -10.44 -0.259*** -8.17 -0.147*** -4.16 
DiffGrowth -0.001 -0.80 -0.050* -1.73 0.009 1.50 
DomEarn 0.769*** 14.95 0.745*** 9.25 0.619*** 4.43 
ForEarn 1.297*** 2.83 2.261*** 2.86 3.576** 2.49 
ForEarn * SFAS131 0.978*** 3.04 0.856** 2.03 1.933*** 3.10 
ForEarn * PM -0.014 -0.53 -0.009 -0.28 0.051 0.10 
ForEarn *  FShare -0.955* -1.66 -1.038 -1.10 -1.264 -0.76 
ForEarn * Size -0.039 -0.58 -0.180* -1.68 -0.288* -1.80 
ForEarn * DiffGrowth -0.004 -0.19 -0.099 -0.18 0.256 1.10 
       
N 8,980  5,491  2,144  
Adj R2  0.054  0.046  0.062  
 
Panel B: Control for structural changes (remove firms with more than 35% change in total assets)  
 Full Sample Balanced Sample Fixed Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.047***  5.89 0.037***  3.28 0.010 0.79 
SFAS131 0.153***  7.71 0.174***  7.05 0.157*** 6.31 
DomEarn 0.811*** 13.33 0.860*** 10.27 0.659*** 4.85 
ForEarn 0.955***  4.62 1.049***  3.26 1.074** 2.49 
ForEarn * SFAS 131 1.341***  3.91 1.255***  2.80 3.103*** 5.04 
       
N 8,073  5,452  2,187  
Adj R2 0.042  0.042  0.076  
47 
 
 
 
Regressions are run using firm fixed-effects estimation. The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal 
return computed using the market model. The parameters of the market model are estimated over the 36 months 
preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market returns. The monthly returns are cumulated starting 
the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and ending three months after the termination of the 
current fiscal year. DomEarn (ForEarn) is the change in per share after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by 
the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. PM is the profit margin of foreign operations. FShare is foreign 
revenues as percent of total revenues. Size is the logarithm of total assets. No inferences are changed if we instead 
use the first difference in size. DiffGrowth is the difference between year-to-year foreign sales growth and domestic 
sales growth (consistent with Bodnar and Weintrop 1997). The sample size for the Panel A sensitivity analysis is 
reduced given the need to have non-zero values for domestic and foreign sales in the previous year.  SFAS131 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation is post SFAS 131 and zero otherwise. Instit is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional shareholders. POS is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if foreign earnings innovations are positive and zero otherwise. Full Sample refers to the entire sample 
period, Balanced Sample has only 4 years prior and 4 years after SFAS131 adoption observations, Fixed Sample has 
only firms that have data 4 years before and 4 years after SFAS 131 adoption. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively.  
Table 5: Sensitivity Analyses for H1 
Panel C: Control for Institutional Shareholders’ Percentage Holdings 
 Full Sample Balanced Sample Fixed Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.045*** 6.25 0.047*** 4.60 0.030* 1.88 
SFAS131 0.187*** 8.88 0.205*** 8.13 0.167*** 5.40 
Instit -0.696*** -7.85 -0.915*** -7.36 -0.596*** -3.35 
DomEarn 0.807*** 16.27 0.822*** 11.24 0.905*** 5.79 
ForEarn 0.693*** 2.88 1.068*** 2.80 1.828** 2.26 
ForEarn * SFAS131 1.101*** 3.45 1.137*** 2.81 3.378*** 4.83 
ForEarn * Instit 0.525 0.79 -0.688 -0.77 -2.113 -1.14 
       
N 9,439  5,983  1,692  
Adj R2  0.051  0.048  0.088  
Panel D: Controls for positive and negative foreign earnings innovations 
 Full Sample Balanced Sample Fixed Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept  0.041***  6.10  0.030***  3.12  0.014  1.14 
POS  0.069***  4.02  0.063***  2.71  0.028  0.99 
SFAS131  0.109***  5.35  0.129***  5.31  0.105***  3.92 
DomEarn  0.738*** 16.25  0.804*** 11.84  0.821***  6.53 
ForEarn -1.779*** -4.06 -0.901 -1.45 -0.490 -0.53 
ForEarn * POS  3.768***  7.03  2.480***  3.28  2.218**  1.97 
ForEarn * SFAS131  0.056  0.08  0.058  0.08  0.062  0.06 
ForEarn * SFAS131* POS  1.980**  2.23  1.891**  1.96  4.392***  2.99 
       
N 11,328  7,098  2,520  
Adj R2  0.052  0.046  0.079  
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Table 6: Effects of the Change in Number of Geographic Segments (H2) and the Inclusion of Performance Measures (H3) on the 
Foreign Earnings Response Coefficient in the post SFAS 131 period. 
Panel A: POST SFAS 131 results (Main Results) 
 GSEG PMEAS GSEG and PMEAS 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.092*** 5.64 0.092*** 5.66 0.108*** 6.30  0.108***  6.30 0.089*** 4.87  0.089***  4.88 
GSEG 0.115*** 3.03 0.116*** 3.07     0.113*** 2.97  0.114***  3.01 
PMEAS     0.016 0.48  0.016  0.48 0.007 0.21  0.008  0.23 
DomEarn 0.780*** 9.18 0.639*** 6.92 0.786*** 9.25  0.822***  8.08 0.778*** 9.16  0.675***  6.36 
ForEarn 1.821*** 4.50 1.872*** 4.63 1.749*** 4.13  1.734***  4.09 1.230*** 2.70  1.222***  2.68 
DomEarn * GSEG   0.899*** 3.85        0.959***  4.09 
ForEarn * GSEG 2.685*** 3.05 2.033** 2.27     2.546*** 2.89 1.799** 2.01 
DomEarn * PMEAS       -0.117 -0.63   -0.159 -0.85 
ForEarn * PMEAS     2.418*** 3.00 2.476***  3.05 2.262*** 2.81  2.535***  3.12 
N 3,663  3,663  3,663  3,663   3,663   3,663  
Adj R2  0.043  0.046  0.040  0.040  0.044  0.048  
             
Panel B: PRE  SFAS 131 results (Difference-in-Difference Sensitivity Analysis) 
 GSEG PMEAS GSEG and PMEAS 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.015** -2.38 -0.015** -2.37 -0.012* -1.77 -0.011* -1.73 -0.012* -1.74 -0.012* -1.70 
GSEG -0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -0.05     0.003 0.18 0.003 0.17 
PMEAS     -0.019 -1.27 -0.020 -1.33 -0.020 -1.30 -0.021 -1.35 
DomEarn 0.779*** 20.82 0.771*** 19.67 0.779*** 20.83 0.750*** 18.88 0.779*** 20.81 0.744*** 18.06 
ForEarn 1.346*** 8.64 1.352*** 8.66 1.269*** 7.88 1.292*** 8.01 1.306*** 7.80 1.334*** 7.94 
DomEarn * GSEG   0.089 0.68       0.070 0.53 
ForEarn * GSEG -0.379 -0.77 -0.429 -0.86     -0.405 -0.82 -0.442 -0.88 
DomEarn * PMEAS       0.254** 2.16   0.250** 2.12 
ForEarn * PMEAS     0.261 0.65 0.122 0.30 0.273 0.68 0.137 0.34 
N 7,665  7,665  7,665  7,665  7,665  7,665  
Adj R2  0.074  0.074  0.074  0.074  0.073  0.074  
             
F*GSEG Diff. Test (p-value) 3.51***(0.000) 2.80***(0.005)   3.37***(0.000)    2.55**(0.011) 
F*PMEAS Diff Test (p-value)   2.77***(0.005) 2.99***(0.002) 2.55**(0.011) 3.04***(0.002) 
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Notes to Table 6 [ 
The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The parameters of 
the market model are estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market 
returns. The monthly returns are cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and 
ending three months after the termination of the current fiscal year. DomEarn (ForEarn) is the change in per share 
after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. ∆GSEG is an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation belongs to a firm that increased the number of geographic 
segments post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise). PMEAS is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation 
belongs to a firm that discloses at least one performance (earnings) measure post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise). F * 
GSEG (PMEAS) Diff. test reports the t-statistic and p-value (two tailed) of a difference test between the post SFAS 
131 foreign earnings interaction coefficient and the pre SFAS 131 foreign earnings interaction coefficient. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively. 
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Table 7: Additional Sensitivity Analyses for H2 and H3 
Panel A: Controls for  foreign operations profit margin, foreign revenue percentage, firm size, and 
differential sales growth 
 GSEG PMEAS GSEG and PMEAS 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.169*** 2.62 0.171*** 2.60 0.164** 2.50 
GSEG 0.127*** 3.29   0.124*** 3.23 
PMEAS   0.021 0.59 0.012 0.33 
PM -0.015 -0.44 -0.013 -0.37 -0.013 -0.37 
FShare 0.141* 1.71 0.173** 2.09 0.138* 1.67 
Size -0.021** -2.47 -0.019** -2.32 -0.020** -2.43 
DiffGrowth -0.001 -1.40 -0.001 -1.40 -0.001 -1.39 
DomEarn 0.840*** 8.13 0.851*** 8.22 0.834*** 8.07 
ForEarn 3.770** 2.51 3.310** 2.16 3.159** 2.07 
ForEarn *  GSEG 2.969*** 3.37   2.917*** 3.31 
ForEarn *  PMEAS   1.892** 2.30 1.779** 2.17 
ForEarn * PM 0.290 0.36 0.180 0.22 0.131 0.16 
ForEarn *  FShare -0.543 -0.32 0.029 0.02 -0.733 -0.43 
ForEarn * Size -0.368* -1.71 -0.306 -1.41 -0.340 -1.58 
ForEarn * DiffGrowth 0.107 1.03 0.108 1.04 0.105 1.01 
       
N 2,899  2,899  2,899  
Adj R2  0.047  0.041  0.048  
 
Panel B: Control for structural changes (remove firms with more than 35% change in total assets)  
 GSEG PMEAS GSEG and PMEAS 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.095*** 5.83 0.107*** 6.19 0.090*** 4.91 
GSEG 0.103*** 2.69   0.099*** 2.60 
PMEAS   0.026 0.77 0.018 0.53 
DomEarn 0.705*** 8.34 0.711*** 8.40 0.704*** 8.32 
ForEarn 1.846*** 4.58 1.721*** 4.09 1.248*** 2.75 
ForEarn* GSEG 2.514*** 2.88   2.358*** 2.69 
ForEarn * PMEAS 
  
2.448*** 3.06 2.285*** 2.85 
       
N 3,509  3,509  3,509  
Adj R2 0.039  0.037  0.040  
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Notes to Table 7 
The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The parameters of 
the market model are estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-weighted market 
returns. The monthly returns are cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year end month and 
ending three months after the termination of the current fiscal year. DomEarn (ForEarn)  is the change in per share 
after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. PM is the profit 
margin of foreign operations. FShare is foreign revenues as percent of total revenues. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. No inferences are changed if we instead use the first difference in size. DiffGrowth is the difference between 
year-to-year foreign sales growth and domestic sales growth (consistent with Bodnar and Weintrop 1997). The sample 
size for the Panel A sensitivity analysis is reduced given the need to have non-zero values for domestic and foreign 
sales in the previous year.  ∆GSEG is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation belongs to a firm 
that increased the number of geographic segments post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise). PMEAS is an indicator variable 
that takes the value one if the observation belongs to a firm that discloses at least one performance (earnings) measure 
post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), 
respectively.  
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Table 8: Self-Selection Tests (Additional Sensitivity Analysis for H2 and H3) 
Panel A: First stage Probit models for year of SFAS 131 adoption 
GSEG PMEAS 
 
Coeff. χ2-stat Coeff. χ2-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.217 0.054 -0.840 0.990 
OWNER -0.072 1.275  0.019 0.110 
ASYMMETRY 0.250** 5.844  0.038 0.243 
PIN -0.859 0.135  2.319 1.345 
LEVERAGE 0.819 1.871 -0.034 0.004 
LIQUIDITY 0.096 1.552  0.016 0.048 
CAPIT 0.422*** 8.785 -0.007 0.023 
HERF -1.995 0.455  1.118 0.220 
MB 0.059*** 8.772  0.062*** 9.067 
ROE -0.756 2.150 -0.162 0.095 
PM_DOM 1.145 1.631  0.271 0.089 
PM_FOR 0.888 2.406 -1.354** 4.778 
SIZE -0.162* 3.249 -0.047 0.355 
     
Concordant Obs. (Discordant Obs) 72% (28%) 65% (35%) 
Likelihood Ratio (p-value) 43.50 (0.000) 24.30 (0.013) 
McFadden’s R2 0.120  0.060  
     
Panel B: Second stage estimation  
 GSEG PMEAS 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept  0.070***  3.96  0.100***  5.31 
GSEG  0.217***  4.01   
PMEAS    0.038  0.86 
DomEarn  0.852***  9.55  0.850***  9.50 
ForEarn  1.714***  4.29  1.709***  4.02 
ForEarn * GSEG  2.591***  2.92   
ForEarn * PMEAS    1.918**  2.45 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.119*** -2.69 -0.031 -0.79 
     
N 3,621  3,621  
Adj R2  0.045  0.040  
 
PANEL A: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one (zero otherwise) if the firm 
increases the number of geographic segments or includes performance measures in geographic segment disclosures, 
respectively. OWNER is the industry-adjusted logarithm of the number of common shareholders, ASYMMETRY is 
the coefficient of variation in analysts’ earnings forecasts three months before annual earnings are announced, PIN is 
the probability of informed trade (source: http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer), LEVERAGE is total 
liabilities divided by total assets, CAPIT is industry-adjusted capital expenditures scaled by net sales, LIQUIDITY is 
the current ratio, MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, PM_DOM (PM_FOR) is profit 
margin for domestic (foreign) operations, ROE is return on equity at firm level, HERF is the firm specific Herfindahl 
Index which is equal to the weighted average (weights are segments’ sales) of the industry-specific index which is 
2
1
( / )n ii s S=  (a detailed explanation is in the text), SIZE is the logarithm of firm total assets. All variables are computed 
in the year prior to the year of SFAS 131 adoption.  
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PANEL B: The dependent variable is UR which is annual abnormal return computed using the market model. The 
parameters of the market model are estimated over the 36 months preceding the current fiscal year using value-
weighted market returns. The monthly returns are cumulated starting the fourth month after the previous fiscal year 
end month and ending three months after the termination of the current fiscal year. DomEarn (ForEarn) is the 
change in per share after tax domestic (foreign) earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
GSEG is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the observation belongs to a firm that increased the number 
of geographic segments post SFAS 131 (zero otherwise).  PMEAS is an indicator variable that takes the value one if 
the observation belongs to a firm that discloses at least one performance (earnings) measure post SFAS 131 (zero 
otherwise). Inverse Mills Ratios are computed using results of the first stage Probit models estimated annually post 
131 adoption. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively.   
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Table 9: Mispricing Results (Mishkin Test) 
Nonlinear least squares regression of the relation between one-period ahead size adjusted returns 
and foreign and domestic current earnings changes 
 
i,t+1 0 i,t i,t i,t+1
* *
i,t+1 71 72 i,t+1 0 i,t i,t i,t+1
Earn  =  + DomEarn  + ForEarn  +  
AR =  + ( Earn  -  - DomEarn  - ForEarn ) +   
D F
D F
α α α
β β α α α
∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆
 
 
Pre SFAS 131 Post SFAS 131 
 
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
0α  -0.001 -1.63 -0.013*** -7.54 
Dα  -0.188*** -12.21 -0.175*** -7.65 
*
Dα  -0.137
*** 
-2.68 -0.162* -1.77 
Fα  -0.097** -2.11 -0.131* -1.70 
*
Fα  -0.548
*** 
-3.57 -0.099 -0.32 
71β  0.002 0.22 0.031*** 2.24 
72β  1.722*** 26.83 1.922*** 12.87 
     
N 7,867  2,661  
     
Market efficiency tests Chi-Squared Statistic p-value 
Chi-Squared  
Statistic p-value 
*
D Dα α=  0.902 0.342 0.019 0.889 
*
F Fα α=  8.198 0.004 0.009 0.921 
*
D Dα α=  and 
*
F Fα α=  8.446 0.014 0.033 0.984 
 
 
Abnormal returns are computed by subtracting from the raw returns the value-weighted returns of the size decile 
portfolios provided by CRSP, where the size decile membership is determined at the time when returns start 
cumulating (i.e., three months after the fiscal year end). DomEarn (ForEarn) is the change in after tax domestic 
(foreign) earnings scaled by the average total assets over the current year. Market efficiency is tested using a 
likelihood ratio statistic that is distributed 2 ( )qχ  and is equal to 2nLog(SSRc/SSRu) where q is the number of 
constraints, n is the number of observations, SSRc is the sum of squared residuals for the constrained system, and SSRu 
is the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained system. SFAS131 is an indicator variable that takes the value 
one if the observation is post SFAS 131 and zero otherwise. The F-test for Foreign Earnings tests whether the 
coefficient of foreign earnings post SFAS 131 is equal to zero. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels (two-sided tests), respectively. 
 
 
